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Executive Summary 
In recent years, the Kenyan government has increasingly developed labor export poli-
cies to secure employment for its nationals in the Gulf countries.  Between 100,000 – 
300,000 Kenyan migrants—mostly unskilled laborers — are represented in the Gulf 
countries’ population, and this number is expected to grow given the high demand for 
inexpensive foreign workers in the Gulf countries.  Kenya’s labor export policies fa-
cilitate important economic strategies that enable the government to address the Gulf 
countries’ labor shortages, while easing the growing unemployment problems in Ken-
ya.   However, the Kenyan government has not formed a comprehensive protection 
policy nor developed bilateral labor arrangements and institutional/diplomatic capaci-
ty to safeguard Kenyans from labor violations and exploitation. This paper examines 
the Kenyan government's complex role in and its challenges with protecting its na-
tionals in the Gulf countries, while analyzing the emerging contemporary migration 
flow between Kenya and the Gulf countries, mainly in Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. We argue that the power asymmetry between the Kenyan and Gulf 
governments directly affects bilateral migration policymaking, particularly labor pro-
tection and migrant welfare.  This paper further asserts that macro-factors - the Gulf 
countries’ bilateral trade with Kenya, humanitarian aid assistance as “soft-power”, 
and open immigration systems - have constrained the Kenyan government's ability to 
protect its nationals in the host countries. 
 
Major Findings 
 The Kenyan government has not developed a comprehensive labor protection 
strategy (i.e. absence of bilateral labor agreement, labor/welfare offices, orien-
tation campaigns) to protect their nationals from labor exploitation. 
 The Kenyan government finds it difficult to protect the labor rights of its na-
tionals in the Gulf countries due to a perceived fear that Gulf countries would 
cut trade, rescind humanitarian aid, and limit immigration with Kenya.  
 The Kenyan government’s regulations have remained ineffective (as indicated 
by massive corruption, ineffective policing of unethical recruiters, illegal labor 
deployment, and the growth of labor violations and exploitations, specifically 
among domestic workers), making Kenyans vulnerable in the Gulf countries.  
 The Kenyan government continues to aggressively pursue higher deployment 
rates, particularly youth workers, despite the absence of labor cooperation. 
 Kenya’s labor export policy will continue to be a long-term feature of Kenya’s 
foreign labor policy, as it offers significant economic opportunities, like remit-
tances, and helps to reduce the Kenya’s unemployment problems.  
 
Recommendations 
 The Kenyan government should consider a Task Force Committee to review 
the labor governance issues faced by its nationals—including but not limited 
to corruption, unethical recruitment, dispute resolutions, human trafficking –
which undermine the government’s capacity and authority. 
 The Kenyan government should examine and adopt some of the Asian labor-
sending countries’ labor governance strategies and institutions (i.e. bilateral 
labor agreements, labor/welfare offices, contract verification, migration orien-
tation services) to enforce and safeguard workers’ rights. 
 The Kenyan government should develop a strong migrant database and re-
search system to inform Kenya’s labor migration policymaking process.  
Introduction 
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"That [illegal recruitment] problem actually involves a criminal network. We have 
engaged the Saudi ambassador in Kenya and he has advised us that there are some 
members of staff at the embassy who work in cahoots with those crooked recruitment 
agents” (Wandera 2015). 
 
Kenyan Foreign Minister, Moses Wetang 
quoted in 2012,  International Business 
Times 
 
“Between January and August 2015, a total of 1125 Kenyans were deported. It is un-
fortunate that these returnees will claim all sorts of mistreatment including torture, 
denied food, held hostage, kept in concentration camps, modern-day slavery” (Mu-
tambo 2015). 
Kenyan Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,  
quoted in 2015, the Daily Nation 
 
Over the past years, the labor demand in the Gulf countries, the largest non-Western 
migrant destination globally, has increased significantly.  The Dubai Expo 2020 alone 
is expected to create more than 275, 000 employment opportunities across the region. 
In Qatar, however, a recent policy study estimated that the World Cup 2020 would be 
required between 500,000 and one million semi-skilled and unskilled migrants to 
work in construction, hospitality, domestic work, and other related unskilled indus-
tries (Morgan et.al 2012). Also, it is projected that the Pan-GCC rail—a railway sys-
tem that will begin in Kuwait and pass through Saudi, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and 
Oman— will generate more than 80,000 jobs (Al Anazi 2016).   Thus, the demand for 
foreign migrant labor will increase and be governed by the Gulf countries’ Kafala 
sponsorship system—a state policy used to organize, govern, and control the migrant 
population—which is characterized by restrictive labor and mobility rights, particular-
ly for unskilled workers (Jureidini 2010, 2014; Naufal and Genc 2013; Shah 2004; 
Ruhs 2013).  While Asian labor migrants have traditionally filled these shortages, re-
cent African labor migrants, specifically from Kenya, have increasingly filled these 
labor shortages due to the ongoing diplomatic disputes between the governments of 
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Asia and some Gulf countries, involving the migrants’ labor rights and welfare.2   The 
diplomatic tensions between Asian and Gulf countries, combined with the deepening 
of Gulf labor shortages, have prompted Gulf governments to encourage other migrant 
labor flows, particularly from the African continent.  
Recently, African labor-sending countries like Kenya have intensified the de-
ployment of their nationals to the Gulf countries.  The Gulf Labor Markets and Migra-
tion (GLMM) data suggests that the Kenyan migrant population is one of the fastest 
growing unskilled labor migrant populations in the Gulf countries.  These migrants 
often work as domestic workers, cleaners, servers, taxi drivers, construction workers, 
and, in some cases, related administrative-related jobs.   International labor rights or-
ganizations claim that these Kenyan migrants, particularly domestic workers, have 
very limited protection in the Gulf labor market (Begum 2015).  This problem raises 
complex regulatory and institutional challenges, making it difficult for the Kenyan 
government to protect their nationals in the Gulf countries.    
This paper examines the Kenyan government’s challenges in extending labor 
protection to unskilled Kenyan migrants in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  This paper is 
divided into five sections.  The first section investigates the emerging contemporary 
Kenyan migration to the Gulf countries, highlighting the key trends and migration 
policy issues in the region. The second section analyzes the Kenyan government’s 
labor export model and its current policies and institutions that address Kenyan mi-
gration issues in the Gulf countries.   The third section examines the Kenyan govern-
ment’s current state actions and challenges in the Gulf countries.  The fourth section 
highlights various factors that appear to constrain the Kenyan government’s ability to 
                                                 
2 In recent years, Asian labor-sending governments of India, Philippines, and Indonesia have diplomat-
ically asserted migrants rights' in the Gulf countries, particularly on minimum wage laws, standard 
working hours/conditions, and other safety nets. 
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develop or enforce labor protection in the Gulf countries.  The concluding section dis-
cusses areas where migration policy research is needed for the Africa-Gulf migration 
corridors. 
Historical and Contemporary Migration Pathways and Trends 
 
Kenyan Population Data in the Gulf Countries 
 
Since the 1950s, many high-skilled Kenyan migrants have emigrated to Western 
countries and, in some cases, within neighboring African countries, in search of high-
er education or advanced training (Migration Policy Institute 2015).  After Kenya's 
decolonization in 1963, many Kenyans moved to Western countries to pursue higher 
education.  However, due to weak internal economic conditions during the 1980s and 
1990s, Kenyan’s circular migration trends changed from temporary to a permanent 
migration.  The violent political conflicts that triggered amidst national elections and 
corruption in Kenya prompted many Kenyans to settle in Western countries, where 
they continue to live even today.  Available data stock suggests that the United King-
dom (UK) has been a top destination for Kenyan migrants - the population of Kenyan 
nationals in the UK reached 152,999 during 2010.   In Tanzania, there were 91,146, in 
the United States 85,123, in Uganda 41,063, and in Canada there were 26,164.  These 
particular migration trends reflect the contemporary migration trends of Kenyans, as 
well as the growing emigration rate globally.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
However, with the increasing immigration restrictions (i.e. visa requirements) 
in the West, many Kenyan migrants—mostly semi- and unskilled—and other African 
migrants have been increasingly pressured to move to the Gulf countries in search of 
economic opportunity (Flahaux and de Haas 2016; Malit, Jr. and Oliver 2014).   Be-
cause of the government’s inconsistent data collection of migrant population, there 
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are no accurate official figures of the number of Kenyan migrants in the Gulf region 
(Shah 2008; Naufal and Genc 2014). However, the Kenyan government estimated that 
at least 100,000 Kenyan migrants are currently living and working in the Gulf region.  
However, Trace Kenya (a charity which rescues Kenyan workers trapped in the Mid-
dle East) reported that in Saudi Arabia alone, 80,000 Kenyans are already presently 
working in the country, while others estimated that at least 300,000 Kenyans are cur-
rently present in the Gulf countries (Ngugi 2014; Migiro 2015).   As Table 2 indi-
cates, the GLMM database states that 40,000 Kenyan migrants have migrated to the 
Gulf states, mostly to the UAE, making the UAE the top destination for Kenyan mi-
grants in 2014.    
In Saudi Arabia, approximately 6,800 Kenyan migrants have been identified, 
while other experts indicated at least 80,000 are living and working in the Kingdom.  
In Qatar, conversely, the government hosts 9,300 Kenyan migrants, and this figure is 
projected to increase given the demand for Kenyans for Qatar’s World Cup 2022.  
Other Kenyan migrants were also deployed to other Gulf countries, including Kuwait, 
Oman, and Bahrain (see Table 2), and more recently to Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan.  
While these figures appear to be small, they pose the most significant governance and 
financial challenges to the Kenyan government due to a high level of vulnerability 
face by these unskilled migrants. The Kenyan government has firmly expressed grave 
concern over the growing labor abuses and violations faced by Kenyan migrants in 
the Gulf region.   As the Kenyan Ambassador to the UAE acknowledges, “between 
January and August, 2015, a total of 1,125 Kenyans were deported. It is unfortunate 
that these returnees will claim all sorts of mistreatment including being tortured, de-
nied food, held hostage, and kept in concentration camps like modern-day slavery” 
(Mutambo 2015).  The growing precarious status of Kenyan migrants concentrated in 
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unskilled sectors, poses serious migration governance issues and limits the govern-
ment’s capability to develop protection measures to address migrants’ labor problems. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]3 
 
Kenyan Diasporas and their Remittance Contributions  
 
Remittances from the Kenyan diaspora, including those from labor migrants, 
have played an increasingly vital role in the country’s socioeconomic development.  
The growth of Kenyan migrant population globally has contributed to the overall re-
mittance increase, which has proven to be an important foreign reserve source in 
Kenya. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3 indicates that in 2015 the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) acknowledged that 
the Kenyan diaspora remitted US $1.55 billion (excluding unofficial remittances), 
representing 3% of the country’s gross domestic product.   While the CBK does not 
provide a country-specific breakdown of remittance sources, it highlights that nearly 
50% of remittance shares came from North America. Remittances from Europe to-
taled 32.2%, while 18.2% represented the rest of world, including the Gulf countries.  
Given the increasing migration of Kenyan migrants to the Gulf region, the remittance 
flows from the Gulf countries are expected to rise.  The relative economic growth in 
the Gulf countries, combined with Kenya's proximity to the area, will certainly make 
the Gulf countries’ markets an important source of employment for the Kenyan gov-
ernment to reduce the country’s high unemployment rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The estimates exclude those migrants' dependents, tourist visa holders, or undocumented migrants.   
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The Kenyan Government’s Emigration Policy Approach and Initiatives 
 
To regulate and harness the flow of economic contributions from Kenyan mi-
grant populations, the government has expanded its foreign diplomatic missions, poli-
cies, and programs (see Table 4).  This state strategy has indeed facilitated the emer-
gence of Kenya's labor-export program to the Gulf region. While the government 
drafted and implemented a diaspora policy in 2015, it has not developed a compre-
hensive strategy to address labor violations faced by Kenyans in the Gulf countries.  
The lack of an official labor and welfare office, safe shelter house, and other protec-
tion initiatives in various Kenyan diplomatic missions–similar to the ones that Asian 
laborers have in the Gulf countries—directly contributes to the vulnerability of Ken-
yan migrants (Mutai 2015). Although the government recently set-up a team to visit 
Saudi Arabian and study the administration of foreign employment and management 
of labor migration, no actual policy development has been reported to specifically ad-
dress Kenyan migrant labor problems in the Gulf countries. 
Between 2007 and 2011 Kenya increased its diplomatic presence by establish-
ing embassies and consulates to engage with the Gulf countries (see Table 4 below).  
The Gulf countries also opened (or reopened) their diplomatic missions in Kenya to 
boost bilateral trade cooperation and investments, which signifies the deepening of 
bilateral relations among these countries over the past years.4 In fact, the Kenyan gov-
ernment has installed Kenyan diplomatic missions in all the Gulf countries except 
Bahrain to identify employment opportunities, verify requirements, and market Ken-
yan migrant workers in the Gulf countries.  
 
                                                 
4 The Gulf countries are considered a critical “transit hub” between the East and West, and Kenya also 
intends to position itself as the main transit hub for the Eastern part of Africa. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Also, the Kenyan government has forged various policies to address the broader dias-
pora issues among Kenyans abroad.  As Table 5 highlights, Kenya Vision 2030 is the 
government’s most comprehensive national strategy to “transform Kenya into a newly 
industrializ[ed], middle-income country providing a high quality of life to of its citi-
zens by the year 2030.”  This vision, however, does not address emigration issues.  
Instead, it focuses more on “remittances from Kenyans abroad” and the need to de-
velop a “comprehensive remittances strategy” to engage with the Kenyan diaspora. 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Other government planning and policy documents, including the Kenya Dias-
pora Policy in 2015, prioritized the integration of the Kenyan diaspora into the coun-
try's development process. The plan specifically develops measures and mechanisms 
to enhance protection of Kenyans abroad.  In addition, the Kenya Foreign Policy ad-
dresses Kenyan diaspora issues, including the promotion and protection of Kenyan 
interests’ abroad. While both governments’ efforts focus on general diaspora interests 
and concerns, they do not have detailed implementation strategies.  Moreover, the 
Kenyan government has drafted both the National Migration Policy and the National 
Labor Migration Policy, which encompass migration management, reintegration, la-
bor rights, and protection.  These policies focus on both regulating and organizing the 
emigration deployment and monitoring and protecting Kenyans abroad. The govern-
ment  remains ineffective in its capacity to regulate its policies, particularly in the 
Gulf countries. 
The Kenyan government has developed labor-export programs to deploy Ken-
yan workers, including youths who want to obtain foreign employment opportunities 
abroad. The Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Services (MOLSS), a government 
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agency responsible for the temporary labor migration of Kenyans abroad, acknowl-
edges that between January 2011 and June 2013 it formally placed 14,516 Kenyans in 
all Gulf countries (except Oman) through private employment agencies (IOM 2015).   
In 2013, Kenya's Ministry of Devolution and Planning's Youth Employment Scheme 
Abroad (YESA) specifically placed youths to work in the Middle East region, particu-
larly in the Gulf countries.  In 2013, under the YESA program, 11,495 Kenyan youths 
were deployed, of which 61.9% obtained employment in the Gulf countries, mostly in 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain.   The inconsistent and dis-
crepancy of data on the official total number of Kenyan migrants in the Gulf countries 
between Kenyan and the Gulf governments’ estimates, imply critical governance is-
sues. Therefore, the Kenyan government’s labor export programs indicate its growing 
focus on the deployment of labor to Gulf countries to compete against Asian labor-
sending countries to secure foreign employment opportunities for Kenyan migrant 
workers abroad, despite weak labor protection in place for their nationals.  
Kenya and the GCC Kafala Sponsorship System 
 
The Kafala sponsorship program is a government policy used to organize and 
control GCC-based migrant populations. Kafala requires all migrants to have an offi-
cial local sponsor responsible for their immigration, visa, and residency status in the 
country (Malit, Jr. and Al Youha, 2013; Gardner 2010).  The kafeel (Arabic for spon-
sor) controls and regulates the movement of the migrants and has the absolute discre-
tion on the migrants' legal and mobility status in the country.  In addition, private sec-
tor migrants (construction workers, professionals) are mainly governed by the coun-
try’s labor laws, while domestic workers were excluded from legal provisions within 
the labor laws and are administered by the Ministry of Interior (Malit, Jr and Ghafoor, 
2014).  Within the GCC countries’ legal framework on domestic work sector, domes-
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tic workers are placed into a more vulnerable legal position because they have no ac-
cess to the dispute resolution or mediation provided by government labor ministries.  
Within a more international legal context, unlike the many major labor-receiving 
countries in Asia and the West, all GCC governments have not ratified the major ILO 
conventions, particularly the ILO Convention 189 on Domestic Workers adopted in 
2011 and most of the major ILO conventions (Fernandez 2014).  Therefore, the Gulf 
countries tend to offer foreign migrant workers, specifically domestic or other un-
skilled workers, relatively fewer labor rights and protection in the Gulf countries.  In 
the case of Kenyans in the Gulf countries, the Kenyan government is structurally and 
legally constrained due to both its lack of jurisdictional legal authority to impose 
regulations on the Gulf countries and its limited bargaining power in the region.  
These constraints place Kenyan migrants in a legally precarious position.  
Comparative Analysis of the Kenyan Government’s Experience in Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE Corridors 
 
Given the Kenyan government’s migration governance approach, the following sec-
tion highlights some of the critical challenges the Kenyan government faces while 
trying to protect migrants in the Gulf countries. 
 
Illegal and Unethical Recruitment Practices  
 
Recruitment practices—specifically illegal ones—have posed critical policy 
challenges for Kenya and the GCC governments.  Currently, the Kenya-GCC recruit-
ment model is principally run by private sector agents, operating in both origin and 
destination countries to facilitate the placement of foreign workers abroad.  In Ken-
ya’s case, however, while there is no official data on the number of illegal recruitment 
agencies, existing anecdotal reports suggest that the irregular or unlicensed recruit-
ment agencies in Kenya have significantly outnumbered the official ones.  Often, the 
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large presence of illegal recruitment—typically perpetrated by agents or acquaintanc-
es—trigger the unlawful recruitment or trafficking of Kenyans to the Gulf countries, 
often charging exorbitant fees to migrant workers in exchange for foreign job place-
ment abroad.  Martin (2015) notes that “high migration costs and pre-migration debts 
make migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation, reduce remittances and pro-
development impacts of international labor migration, and encourage some migrants 
to overstay their time abroad to achieve savings targets.” Given the relatively easy job 
placement in the Gulf countries, many Kenyan workers continuously pay recruitment 
fees to recruitment agents, including illegal ones, to secure employment.  This type of 
recruitment act negatively impacts the Kenyan government's institutional and admin-
istrative capacity to protect Kenyan migrants' from unethical hiring practices both in 
Kenya and in the Gulf countries. 
In Saudi Arabia, the Kenyan government has reported that Kenyan migrant 
workers are often concentrated in low-skilled occupational sectors.  The Kenyan Am-
bassador, Mr. Mohammad Abdi Mohamud, said non-skilled laborers (household 
workers, farm and construction workers), who form the bulk of Kenyan migrants, face 
serious challenges in protecting their nationals. For example, Kenyan government of-
ficials found it difficult to protect those Kenyan migrants runaways who violate the 
residency status and illicit activities such as alcoholism, pimping, drug trafficking, 
human trafficking, theft, forgery, and prostitution, which tarnish the country’s reputa-
tion (Mutai 2015). In 2010, at least 3,000 Kenyans travelled to visit the Mecca in 
Saudi Arabia using a hajj visa (Jamah 2010).  The problem, however, is that agents 
and brokers utilize this type of hajj visa to facilitate the entry of Kenyan workers, who 
overstay their visas and become illegal by working in Saudi Arabia. There are no ac-
curate figures on the total number of illegal migrants, mainly Kenyans, in the Gulf 
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region since sending countries - like Kenya - and other Gulf countries do not accu-
rately record the number of illegal populations (Fargue et.al 2015). 
Similar to Saudi Arabia, the UAE hosts a large proportion of unskilled Kenyan 
migrants, often concentrated in service-based sectors and hold jobs as cleaners, hospi-
tality workers, domestic workers, or in other low-paying sectors in the UAE labor 
market (GLMM 2014).   However, the Kenyan government in the UAE faces chal-
lenges in controlling recruitment malpractice due to the relatively flexible nature of 
the UAE's immigration policy.  Unlike Saudi Arabia's immigration process, the 
UAE's more flexible immigration process enables Kenyan migrants to enter the UAE 
on a tourist visa; eventually these visas become employment visas.  This "soft" immi-
gration policy strategically permits recruitment agents and brokers, who have connec-
tions in Kenya, to deploy Kenyan migrants as tourists, bypassing any Kenyan gov-
ernment regulations or other related travel warnings.  Kenyan migrants who enter on 
tourist visas often face labor abuse and exploitation from recruiters or agents. Our 
UAE-based fieldwork suggests that many Kenyan visitors/migrants have paid exorbi-
tant fees, between US $1,200 and US $2,000 or more, to secure foreign job placement 
in the UAE.  John, a Kenyan migrant in the UAE, notes, “I came on a tourist visa to 
the UAE. I paid almost $2,500 to come to the UAE and I sold our small business in 
Kenya so I could pay my agent.  When I arrived in the UAE, I didn’t get what I was 
promised. The company in the UAE told me that I'd be a cleaner and said that they 
paid the entire recruitment cost to the agent already.”  This type of illegal and unethi-
cal practice violates UAE government’s recruitment regulations and makes workers 
vulnerable to abuses, debt bondage, and servitude in the labor market. 
Our fieldwork findings revealed that Kenyan agents often forced migrants to 
sign initial contractual arrangements upon arrival in the UAE that provided false 
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information (HRW 2013).  Mark, another Kenyan tourist visa holder, noted, "When I 
came here, there was no job for an administrative position, only for the cleaner. I was 
put in a room with 12 other foreigners, and I had no money.  I thought I was going to 
achieve my dream here, but I had no choice but to take the lower offer. I couldn't go 
back home."  When migrants arrive in the UAE, many recruitment agents and some 
employers force Kenyans to accept the employment contract even though they are 
inconsistent with their initial agreement signed in Kenya. The lack of a pre-departure 
program has provided limited legal and rights awareness to Kenyan migrants, making 
them more vulnerable in the UAE labor market (IOM 2011). This recruitment operat-
ing structure has created significant financial opportunities for brokers/agents to ex-
ploit migrants.  It has also posed regulatory challenge for the UAE-based Kenyan 
consulates and embassies and the UAE government, as they attempt to combat uneth-
ical recruitment practices.  
Contract Substitutions 
 
Many Kenyan migrants often face contract substitution in either origin or des-
tination countries, whereby agents – both legal and illegal – deliberately provide false 
contract information to prospective applicants to lure them to accept their employ-
ment offer.  Often, Kenyans were promised to work as domestic workers but then 
turned to work in domestic servitude, brothels, massage parlors, or in forced manual 
labor (Migiro 2014).  Malit, Jr. and Naufal (2016) argue that recruitment agents often 
play a deliberate role in providing false information to migrants, often giving them 
discretionary power to take advantage of workers’ income and employment status. 
This asymmetric information has generated labor abuses within the market and nega-
tively affected the wages, employment status, and, in some cases, triggered the early 
departure of the migrant in the Gulf countries. 
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In Saudi Arabia, the Kenyan government has increasingly continued to deal 
with the consequences of contract substitutions on migrant workers' behavior and de-
cision-making.  Because of the false promises provided to Kenyan migrants, they of-
ten run away from their sponsors/employers due to labor abuses and contract viola-
tion, particularly on wages, hours of work, and benefits that were not provided by the 
employer.  In 2013, the Kenyan government rescued 800 Kenyan workers in Saudi 
jails for various violations; many of these workers had employers who violated their 
contracts (Migiro 2014). These contract substitutions also put significant administra-
tive, financial, and diplomatic constraints on the frontline Kenyan and Saudi labor 
authorities who have to deal and negotiate with the Saudi government.  
In the UAE, however, the Kenyan government has also continued to face seri-
ous regulatory challenges in protecting Kenyan migrants, particularly domestic work-
ers in the UAE labor market.  As Camille, a Kenyan migrant acknowledges, "I came 
to the UAE as a domestic worker, and I was promised to earn US $400 by my agent, 
and I signed a contract. When I came here, I only received about half. I tried to run 
away but I could not because I didn't know anyone. I finally ran away and was report-
ed to the Kenyan authorities." In Camille’s case, the Kenyan government has no ca-
pacity to enforce a contract signed by Camille with her agent because the UAE gov-
ernment does not honor unofficial contracts signed by migrants with agents (HRW 
2013).  Furthermore, the Kenyan government has no capacity to extend dispute reso-
lution to Camille because, as a domestic worker, she is excluded from the UAE na-
tional labor law's dispute resolution mechanisms to appeal for an employee's rights.   
This case indicates the Kenyan government's limited capacity and power to both pro-
tect its nationals and impose its regulations on the host country. 
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Moreover, while some Kenyan migrants report abuses to the Kenyan consulate 
in Dubai or embassy in the capital city of Abu Dhabi, others do not report the problem 
to the Kenyan authorities due to perceiving "long process" and "inability" of the gov-
ernment to extend protection for them.  Because of these particular challenges, the 
Kenyan government finds it difficult to understand and address the critical challenges 
faced by Kenyan migrants in the UAE.  
Bureaucratic Corruption 
The corruption issues, particularly among state officials and agents, have also 
undermined the legitimacy of Kenyan institutions and policymaking, which, to a large 
extent, has serious policy implications for Kenyan migrants' welfare in the Gulf coun-
tries. As echoed in the UAE case, Kenyan migrants in Saudi Arabia often report per-
ceived inadequacy and corruption of state officials who are mandated to assist Ken-
yan migrants in the country.  The Kenyan labor minister acknowledged that Kenyan 
staff embassies often are in "cahoots" with recruitment agents to capitalize on grow-
ing interests of Kenyan migrant workers to find employment in Saudi Arabia (Wan-
dera 2015). The presence of these illegal recruitment agencies, operating jointly with 
some government authorities, actively forced the government to investigate corrup-
tion and malpractice by revoking 930 recruitment agencies on September 29, 2014, 
due to the ongoing labor exploitations reported by Kenyan workers in the Middle East 
(Ngugi 2014).  This “internal” regulatory struggle within the Kenyan bureaucratic 
government poses a critical threat to the government's legitimate role as a state pro-
tector of the entire Kenyan migrant population in the Gulf countries. 
In the UAE, the Kenyan community has discussed the perceived massive cor-
ruption among Kenyan foreign diplomatic missions.  In fact, the Kenyan government 
has subtly highlighted its significant presence within foreign diplomatic missions, 
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which has critical implications for Kenyan diaspora relations (see an introductory 
quote from the Kenyan labor minister).  Many interviewed Kenyan migrants often do 
not seek welfare support and assistance from the governing consulate due to the per-
ceived corruptions in place, which reduces their institutional trust in governing offi-
cials.  As one Kenyan migrant, James, says, "Many Kenyans don't really go there be-
cause they [officials] don't care. Even if we ask for help, they will not help us. They 
only care about themselves, and they are not welcoming people.  Because of this, 
many Kenyans don't go there to ask for help.  It's not going to do us good." This lack 
of trust impacts the officials' ability to engage with Kenyan nationals and foster good 
diplomatic relationships with the diaspora community living and working in the UAE.  
Absence of bilateral labor agreements  
 
The Kenyan government has not formalized bilateral labor cooperation 
agreements with any Gulf governments, therefore placing Kenyan migrants in a more 
vulnerable legal position in the host country.  In Saudi Arabia, the Kenyan govern-
ment has continued to export unskilled laborers who are often vulnerable to labor 
abuses and exploitation due to the lack of protection mechanisms. In fact, HRW re-
ports suggest that employers of Kenyan domestic workers often illegally deduct their 
wages, and in some cases, do not pay them at all, violating the Kenyan domestic 
workers' contractual rights.  This lack of bilateral labor agreement makes it difficult 
for the Kenyan government to assert workers' rights and places the workers and their 
families in Kenya in a legally and financially precarious position. 
Similarly, the Kenyan government has not signed a labor agreement with the 
UAE government, which makes Kenyan migrants vulnerable in the host country.   
Given the increasing number of Kenyan domestic workers in the UAE, no existing 
bilateral agreements have been signed publicly to address Kenyan migrants' labor pro-
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tection problems.  The lack of an established bilateral labor agreement, particularly 
for domestic workers, presents a critical gap that the Kenyan government needs to 
reconsider. 
 
The Kenyan Government’s Policy Interventions and Limitations 
 
Given the Kenyan government’s complex challenges in the Gulf countries, it has ac-
tively pursued various policy measures –often temporary and with limited mecha-
nisms—to address the growing labor violations faced by Kenyan migrants.  The fol-
lowing section highlights several recent attempts by the government to address labor 
abuses reported by Kenyans in the Gulf countries. 
 
Deployment Policy Ban 
 
In June 2012, the Kenyan government banned the deployment of Kenyan do-
mestic workers to all countries in the Middle East because of the growing pressure  
from local and international Kenyan civil society groups (Hiraan Online 2016).  How-
ever, in November of 2013, the government lifted the deployment policy ban.  As the 
Kenyan Ambassador to Saudi Arabia acknowledges, “As a way forward, if there are 
no watertight protections for female workers to the kingdom, the government should 
ban exportation of women workers to the kingdom due to their vulnerability and strict 
conditions for women in the kingdom” (Mutambo 2015).  In response to the growing 
abuses reported by Kenyans abroad, on September 29, 2014, the Kenyan government 
also revoked 930 licenses of recruitment agencies that recruit Kenyans working in the 
Middle East, particularly in the Gulf countries. While this government effort is a sig-
nificant symbolic step toward addressing labor violations, the recruitment and report-
ed abuse of Kenyan migrants have remained.  In fact, illegal deployment of Kenyan 
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domestic workers to Saudi Arabia has continued due to the growing corruption em-
bedded in the recruitment industry (IOM 2015). 
Shelter Houses and an Assistance Fund 
 
Because of the growing presence of runaway, abused domestic workers, the 
Kenyan Parliament has recommended that the government’s Treasury needs to set up 
a fund, whose proceeds will be used to rescue Kenyan migrant workers stranded in 
the Middle East (Mutai 2015). The National Assembly Committee on Labor and So-
cial Welfare acknowledges, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
and the National Treasury should provide a special fund to the missions in the Middle 
East, especially Saudi Arabia, to enable them to deal with the numerous migrant labor 
challenges, including setting up a safe house.”  This safe house, similar to other Gulf-
based Asian labor-sending countries, is a protection strategy by the Kenyan govern-
ment that practically would serve as a temporary housing for domestic and other-
related workers who are awaiting for their labor, immigration, and police cases prior 
to their repatriation to Kenya.    While these proposals have already been highlighted, 
no actual policy programs or mechanisms have been developed or implemented to 
address the growing vulnerability of Kenyan migrants in the Gulf countries.  
 
Macro- Factors that Constrain the Kenyan Government’s Protection Ability 
 
Growing Bilateral Trade Between the Gulf Countries and Kenya 
 
The Kenyan government’s economic relationship with the Gulf countries  
constrains the government’s ability to protect its nationals and address labor abuses 
faced by Kenyan migrants.   Given the Gulf countries' economic relevance – both in 
the labor market, trade, and investment opportunities – the Kenyan government has 
prioritized critical trade relationships with the Gulf countries to maximize its national 
economic interests abroad.  In 2011, the Kenyan and UAE governments signed (but 
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have not yet ratified) an agreement to increase trade relations by preventing double 
taxation in each country and finalizing customs administrative support agreements to 
promote and protect investments (Odhiambo 2011). Their effort aims to boost UAE 
investor relations with Kenya and facilitate longer and friendlier diplomatic ties in the 
long run. Similarly, on September 13, 2014, the Kenyan government signed an im-
portant agreement with Qatar to increase bilateral maritime cooperation by creating a 
direct shipping route between Mombasa and Doha. In accordance with the agreement, 
Kenyan seafarers would obtain employment priority in Qatari shipping lines.  The 
agreement is expected to increase ongoing trade in energy, transport, construction, 
labor, tourism, and agriculture. These particular trade agreements suggest that the 
Kenyan government’s diplomatic and economic interests significantly prevail over the 
labor protection rights for its nationals in the Gulf countries.  
Humanitarian Aid as a Soft Power  
 
The Gulf countries also utilize humanitarian assistance to Kenya as a soft 
power to improve economic diplomacy relationships and affect bilateral migration 
policymaking.  One of Saudi Arabia's humanitarian programs, "Saudi Fund for De-
velopment" has implemented multi-million dollar projects in Kenya, providing aid for 
the Nairobi Water Supply, Kenya-South Sudan Road, Thika-Garissa-Liboi Road, 
Mombasa Sewage, Kiambere Hydro Electricity Power, Agriculture Sector Support, 
and the Garissa Water Supply (Kenyan Embassy in Riyadh, Unknown date).  More 
recently, the Saudi government approved US $ 4.26 million for the construction of the 
146km Nuno-Modagashe road and other assistance to improve the development of 
infrastructure, water, irrigation and agriculture (Amran 2011).  
In the UAE, a civil society group Dar Al Bern, runs 80 charity programs in 
Kenya, offering services such as building mosques, digging wells, and sponsoring or-
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phan children and Quranic teachers in the local community (UAE Interact 2008). Pri-
vate sector entities, such as the UAE's national airline Etihad, partnered with Kenyan-
based organizations, such as Dream Children's Home, and the Children in Freedom 
organization, to provide blankets and school supplies to underprivileged communities. 
This humanitarian assistance deepens and contributes to the ongoing economic rela-
tionships between the Gulf countries and Kenya and subtly impacts Kenya’s ability to 
negotiate or assert labor rights for their nationals in the Gulf countries. By exerting 
more labor protections for its nationals in the Gulf countries, the Kenyan government 
holds an inherent fear that they could affect their diplomatic relationships with Gulf 
governments, and therefore lose market competitiveness for their nationals in the re-
gion.  Humanitarian aid is therefore covered by the Gulf countries’ foreign policy in-
struments, which limits the Kenyan government's ability to assert itself with the Gulf 
countries when it comes to labor migration and protection issues. 
Gulf as an Open Market for Unskilled Workers  
 
Recently, the Kenyan government has fostered stronger amicable diplomatic 
and trade relationships with the Gulf countries to secure employment opportunities for 
Kenyan migrants.  Through the establishment of diplomatic missions in Kenya (ex-
cept Bahrain), the Kenyan government has forged deeper economic links with the 
Gulf countries, which have been able to exert their economic interests—both through 
investment and labor cooperation—helping them maximize Kenya's development po-
tential.   In particular, the Gulf countries’ current labor shortage has compelled them 
to consider Kenyan labor supply and developed broader trade relations on agriculture 
and other critical investments in raw materials.   More importantly, Kenyan migrants 
in the Gulf countries have helped diversify or act as cheaper, labor substitutes to the 
Gulf labor market, and provided an access to low-cost labor to the Gulf-based em-
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ployers. The continuing inflow of Kenyan migrants, particularly domestic workers, 
has symbolically reduced the bargaining power of Asian labor-sending countries (par-
ticularly domestic workers from the Indonesia and the Philippines) and inadvertently 
prolonged the ongoing silent dispute between Gulf countries and Asian sending coun-
tries in the labor market.  This ongoing dispute, however, has therefore become an 
opportunity for the Kenyan government to replenish the labor shortage that once 
Asian labor-sending countries have dominated, particularly domestic work in the 
UAE and Saudi Arabia, and almost all unskilled jobs in the GCC labor market.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the Kenyan government’s complex challenges in extending 
institutional, legal, and diplomatic labor protection to Kenyan migrants in Saudi Ara-
bia and the UAE.  This paper offers the following conclusions.  First, the power 
asymmetry between the Kenyan and Gulf governments limits the Kenyan Govern-
ment's ability to bargain for stronger labor protection for Kenyan migrants. This pow-
er asymmetry is a result of the imbalance of resources each country possesses and the  
Gulf governments increasing use of soft power to potentially exert influence over the 
Kenyan government.  In fact, the Gulf countries' ability to serve as a labor outlet for 
low-skilled Kenyan labor—and, in most cases, act as an economic financier—not on-
ly eases Kenya's economic problem, but also offers a critical source of remittances 
crucial to Kenya's economic development.  Moreover, given the increasing Gulf 
countries' labor shortage, along with current labor bans on other Asian sending coun-
tries' domestic workers, access to Kenya and other Sub-Saharan African countries is 
key to the Gulf's economic development. 
Secondly, the lack of bilateral labor cooperation agreements and unified con-
tracts with the Gulf countries puts Kenya in a difficult position to assert their territori-
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al right to more labor protection, particularly in regard to enforcing contractual rights 
in the region.  Third, the lack of comprehensive priority for labor protection, com-
bined with the limited institutional, administrative, and resource capacities, makes it 
principally difficult to protect Kenyan migrants from labor abuses and exploitation.  
Fourth, because of all of these political dynamics, Kenyan migrants, particularly do-
mestic workers, have become both legally vulnerable and susceptible to more labor 
abuses and exploitation from recruitment brokers/agents, and state bureaucrats.   
Fifth, the highly unregulated nature of Kenya's recruitment industry, combined 
with the bustling informal agents and brokers operating in Kenya and GCC, allow for 
opportunities for recruitment brokers.  This particular context, however, poses direct 
regulatory challenges to the governments of Kenya and the Gulf countries, and simul-
taneously makes Kenyan migrants more vulnerable during the migration process.   
The demand and inflow of Kenyan migrants to the Gulf region is likely to increase in 
the long run.  If the Kenyan government does not act accordingly, the likelihood that 
more Kenyans will be violated will increase over time.  This governance gap not only 
generates practical challenges for the Kenyan government, but also poses threats to 
their country's long-term foreign labor policy approach and their responsibility to-
wards Kenyan migrants living in the Gulf countries. 
On a more broader regional context, the case of Kenya is part of a broader 
trend among many labor-sending African governments, including those of Ethiopia 
and Uganda, that aim to address their growing unemployment problems by develop-
ing labor export-based programs (i.e. Uganda signed in 2014 an agreement with Saudi 
to deploy Ugandan domestic workers) to high-income destination countries, including 
the Gulf countries. However, despite the known limited or weak institutional and reg-
ulatory protections in place, many African labor-sending countries have continued to 
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deploy workers aggressively, often competing against Asian labor-sending countries 
in the Gulf countries. As the growing tension between the Asian and Gulf countries 
has ensued, African migrants, particularly domestic workers, have increasingly 
flowed into the Gulf countries, replacing Asian workers in various unskilled jobs. 
This governmental dilemma of Kenya and other African labor-sending countries has 
not only generated profoundly impacted the labor rights and welfare of migrants, but 
will also serve as a critical migration policy discourse between the Africa-GCC corri-
dor that needs further global scientific inquiry in the future.  
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Table 1: Top 5 Kenyan Migrant Destinations 
 
 
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Kenyan Migrants in the Gulf Countries 
 
 
Source: Migration Policy Institute 2016 
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Table 3: Kenyan Diaspora Remittances (2004-2016) 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Kenya and GCC Establishment Years of Foreign Diplomatic Relationships 
GCC 
Country 
Type of  
Diplomatic  
Mission 
Location Kenya’s  
diplomatic  
mission in the 
GCC 
GCC country’s dip-
lomatic mission in 
Kenya 
Bahrain NA NA NA NA 
Kuwait Embassy Kuwait 
City 
2007 1965 
Oman Embassy Muscat 2011 1977 (opened); 1986 
(closed); 2013 (re-
opened) 
Qatar Embassy Doha 2010 2012 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Embassy Riyadh Unknown Unknown 
UAE Embassy  Abu 
Dhabi 
1982 2012 
  Consulate  Dubai 2010   
Source: Migration Policy Institute 2016 
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Table 5: Kenyan Migration Policy 
Year Policy Content 
2007 Kenya Vision 
2030 
▪ Highlights the country’s development program 
covering the three pillars, which are economic, 
social, and political.  
▪ Focuses on the link between remittances and dias-
pora development  
2009 Draft Kenya Na-
tional Migration 
Policy 
▪ Prepared in 2009 and the current status and con-
tent unknown. 
2010 Kenya National 
Labor Migration 
Policy 
▪ Addresses comprehensive migration topics, in-
cluding labor migration management, individual 
and social security rights, reintegration, labor pro-
tection, labor market opportunities, and formaliza-
tion of foreign labor market partnerships. 
2014 Kenya Foreign 
Policy  
▪ Promotes and protects the interests of Kenyans 
abroad and the enhances partnerships with the 
Kenyan diaspora and their descendants as critical 
elements of Kenya’s foreign policy priorities. 
2014 Kenya Diaspora 
Policy 
▪ Focuses on engaging, organizing, and mobilizing 
with the Kenyan diaspora; extends protection 
measures for the diaspora, while fostering coordi-
nation and dialogues to enhance state-diaspora 
partnerships. 
Source: International Organization for Migration 2015 
